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ABSTRACT
In eflay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., the Supreme Court
declared that an injunction granted to stop and prevent patent
infringement is like any other injunction, and therefore should only
issue after consideration of traditional equitable factors. It is not
yet clear whether this decision has truly changed existing patent
law, but one thing is certain injunctions are no longer viewed as
a guaranteed remedy for patent infringement. One potential effect
of eBay on the world of technology is on the value of patents.
Much of the discussion ofeBay has focused on the decision's effect
on patent owners who do not practice their patent. Without the
threat of a guaranteed permanent injunction, these patent owners
will have less bargaining power in licensing negotiations and
might get less favorable licensing arrangements. This note
discusses this potential change in patent value and its relation to
one primary justification for patent law, the quid pro quo, which
views the patent as an exchange between the inventor and the
public: invention and disclosure in exchange for the right to
exclude. In the post-eBay world, the fact that an injunction is no
longer a guarantee may reduce the value of the right to exclude.
This may create a disparity in the exchange the inventor may
receive less value from the public in the form of a patent while the
public receives more from the invention and disclosure through the
denial of an injunction. This note argues that eBay need not
conflict with the quid pro quo exchange, and that, although current
decisions relying on the Supreme Court's opinion do not do so,
courts can and should use eBay to better tailor the patent right to
the value of the actual contribution of invention and disclosure.
* J.D. Candidate 2010, Yale Law School. I would like to thank Professor Henry
Smith for supervising this paper, and Karen Grohman for her helpful comments
throughout this process.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2006, the Supreme Court of the United States declared in
eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,l that a permanent injunction
for patent infringement should be granted only after weighing the
same equitable considerations as injunctions in other areas of the
law. In doing so, the Court overturned the Federal Circuit's
decision, which followed the common treatment of injunctions
2almost as an automatic remedy for patent infringement. EBay has,
in all likelihood, changed the landscape of patent litigation and
licensing by giving courts more discretion and power to deny
injunctive relief. If an injunction is denied, a court grants in its
place what it deems to be reasonable royalties to the patent owner,
essentially creating an ex post licensing agreement. Thus, the
owner is denied the absolute right to exclude, and a license is
created not as a result of bargaining ex ante, but as a result of an
adversarial judicial proceeding ex post.
A denial of an injunction can and should be viewed as a
reduction of the value of a patent.3 Denying an injunction takes
away the patent owner's option to keep others from using the
patented invention, depriving the patent owner of a significant
bargaining chip in licensing arrangements. Potential licensees
might be encouraged to take their chances and infringe if they feel
that litigation will result in a "reasonable royalty" that would be
less than the asking price for the license. To avoid this outcome,
the patent owner would be forced to accept less in exchange for a
license, reaping less profit from his patent. In this note, I examine
this impact on the value of a patent and its relation to one of the
primary justifications of patent law-the quid pro quo. If a patent
can be viewed as a right granted to its owner by the public in
exchange for an invention and its disclosure, how does eBay affect
this exchange?
Part II of this note provides a review of the litigation
leading up to the Supreme Court's decision. Part III discusses the
potential impact of the decision on trolls and others, while Part IV
1 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
2 MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
3 Without the injunctive power of the courts, the right to
exclude granted by the patent would be diminished, and the
express purpose of the Constitution and Congress, to promote
the progress of the useful arts, would be seriously
undermined. The patent owner would lack much of the
"leverage," afforded by the right to exclude, to enjoy the full
value of his invention in the market place. Without the right to
obtain an injunction, the right to exclude granted to the
patentee would have only a fraction of the value it was
intended to have, and would no longer be as great an incentive
to engage in the toils of scientific and technological research.
Smith Int'l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1577-78 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
3
Pesses: PATENT AND CONTRIBUTION
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2009
11 Yale J.L. & Tech. 309 (2009)
looks at that impact in the context of the quid pro quo. Part V
argues that the goal of keeping the patent right tailored to the value
of the patentee's contribution to society, in consideration of this
patent exchange, is valid under the goals of equity in patent law.
Finally, Part VI explains how such an analysis can fit into the test
laid out by the Supreme Court in eBay.
II. BACKGROUND
A. District Court
On May 27, 2003, a jury in the Eastern District of Virginia
found eBay liable for willfully infringing two patents owned by
MercExchange.4 However, Judge Jerome Fieldman refused to
grant MercExchange a permanent injunction against eBay,
invoking his discretion in doing so.5 Judge Fieldman noted that
injunctions are an equitable remedy and proceeded to analyze the
four factors considered in granting an injunction: "(i) whether the
plaintiff would face irreparable injury if the injunction did not
issue, (ii) whether the plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law, (iii)
whether granting the injunction is in the public interest, and (iv)
whether the balance of the hardships tips in the plaintiffs favor."
6
In analyzing the first factor, the court recognized a presumption of
irreparable harm to MercExchange in the finding of patent validity
and infringement, but cited MercExchange's willingness to license
its patents, its lack of commercial activity, and its media statements
that it was seeking damages and not an injunction, as adequate
factors to overcome this presumption. 7 Similarly, the court found
an adequate remedy at law based on MercExchange's usual
willingness to license its patents. 8 While the court recognized the
general public interest in maintaining the integrity of a patent, it
agreed with the defendant that the status of business method
patents as questionably patentable meant that there was a
countervailing public interest in having the business method patent
practiced (which MercExchange did not do), therefore weighing
the third factor equally for both sides.9 Finally, the court found that
the contentious relationship between the parties, combined with the
adequacy of damages to compensate MercExchange for any
4 MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 698-99 (E.D. Va.
2003). The patents at issue involved a method for searching an online market for
products, U.S. Patent No. 6,085,176 (filed Mar. 8, 1999), and a method for
creating a trusted relationship between consignor and bailee in the online
auction environment, U.S. Patent No. 5,845,265 (Nov. 7, 1995).
5 eBay, 275 F. Supp. 2d at 711.
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continuing infringement, meant that granting an injunction would
simply result in multiple and exhaustive contempt hearings,
incurring costs on all parties without doing much good. The court
concluded that a balance of the hardships weighed in favor of
denying an injunction. 10
B. Federal Circuit
The Federal Circuit disagreed with Judge Fieldman.11
While the court did not declare that an injunction should issue in
all cases of infringement, it noted that a denial of an injunction is
only warranted in very special circumstances, generally when "'a
patentee's failure to practice the patented invention frustrates an
important public need for the invention,' such as the need to use an
invention to protect public health." 12 It therefore rejected Judge
Fieldman's analysis and concluded that the case was not
"sufficiently exceptional to justify the denial of a permanent
injunction." 1 3 The court found that worries over business method
patents and the contentious relationship between the parties were
not specific or unusual enough to deny an injunction in this case,
and that MercExchange's willingness to license its patent "should
not ... deprive it of the right to an injunction to which it would
otherwise be entitled."1 4 The court concluded: "We therefore see
no reason to depart from the general rule that courts will issue




Finally, the Supreme Court intervened to establish a middle
ground.1 6 In a brief, unanimous opinion, it declared that nothing in
the patent law indicated an intent by Congress to depart from the
traditional rules of equity. Therefore, injunctions would only issue
after a showing by the plaintiff:
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that
remedies available at law, such as monetary
damages, are inadequate to compensate for that
injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships
between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in
'1d. at 714-15.
"MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
12 Id. at 1338 (quoting Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley, Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1547 (Fed.
Cir. 1995)).
" Id. at 1339.
14 id
15 Id. at 1340.
16 EBay v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
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equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest
would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.
1 7
While the Court recognized that patent law guarantees a
right to exclude, it explained that "creation of a right is distinct
from the provision of remedies for violations of that right." 18 The
Court agreed with the district court that the four factors should
have been applied, but it found that the district court erred in
adopting "certain expansive principles suggesting that injunctive
relief could not issue in a broad swath of cases." 19 The Court
recognized that categorically denying equitable relief to those who
prefer to license rather than practice their patents would deny
equitable relief to those who deserve it, including self-made
inventors and universities. 20 The Court also rejected the Federal
Circuit's rule of categorically granting injunctions. 21
The Court therefore rejected both the district court's
reasoning and the Federal Circuit's, but it offered no real guidance
as to how to interpret the factors; when an injunction might be
granted and when it might not; or what the status of injunctions for
infringement might be. Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices
Scalia and Ginsberg, wrote a concurring opinion arguing that the
history of granting injunctions for patent infringement was in line
with the four factor test, which usually came out on the side of an
injunction because of the inadequacy of monetary remedies, and
that therefore the decision did not change the landscape of patent
law.22 The Justices accepted the four factor test, but noted that
"there is a difference between exercising equitable discretion
pursuant to the established four-factor test and writing on an
entirely clean slate, 23 and suggested that decisions based on the
test pay attention to the history of issuing injunctions.
In another concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy, joined by
Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, stressed context over
precedent, noting that many of the circumstances surrounding
patent litigation are now different than they were in the past.
24
Companies now exist solely to enforce and license patents, not to
25practice. For example, a patented invention may only be a small
component of a larger infringing device, in which case, damages
may be sufficient to compensate the patent owner, and the denial
of an injunction would keep the patent owner from holding up
17 Id. at 391.
1" Id. at 392.
'9 Id. at 393.
20 id.
21 Id. at 394.
22 Id. at 395 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
23 id.
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production of the larger device.26 The Justices also noted that
injunctions may have different consequences when granted to
business method patents, which are sometimes of questionable
validity.27
III. EBAY AND THE PATENT TROLL: JUSTIFIED PUNISHMENT OR
UNFAIR TARGETING?
EBay's impact has been broadly felt. From the response, it
seems that the legal community has viewed the decision as
momentous, with some praising it for bearing down on patent
trolls, 28 and others expressing worry that the decision will have an
effect on unintended areas.29
A. EBay (Rightfully) Cracks Down on Patent Trolls
EBay probably has its largest effect on patent trolls. Patent
trolls are companies that buy up existing patents and make their
money by either licensing or litigating those patents. Patent trolls
generally do not develop or practice the patent themselves.
Negative portrayals of patent trolls describe them as companies
who buy up small, questionably valid patents, with the hopes of
suing wealthy companies caught using and infringing the
invention.30 Sometimes these patents can make up a single
26 ld.
27 Id. at 397. The Federal Circuit's decision in In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954
(2008), which questions the validity of some business method patents, may
render this point moot.
28 See, e.g., Gavin D. George, Note, What Is Hiding in the Bushes? EBay's
Effect on Holdout Behavior in Patent Thickets, 13 MiCH. TELECOMM. TECH. L.
REV. 557, 560 (2007) (describing eBay as a "revolutionary addition to list of
legal protections against holdouts").
29 See, e.g., William R. Everding, Comment, "Heads-l-Win, Tails-You-Lose":
The Predicament Legitimate Small Entities Face Post eBay and the Essential
Role of Willful Infringement in the Four-Factor Permanent Injunction Analysis,
41 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 189, 202-05 (2007) (expressing worry that eBay will
harm small entities who legitimately do not practice their inventions); Leslie T.
Grab, Recent Development, Equitable Concerns of eBay v. MercExchange: Did
the Supreme Court Successfully Balance Patent Protection Against Patent
Trolls?, 8 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 81, 112-14 (2006) ("In the case of patentees who
do not practice the invention or sell a product, calculation of lost profits and a
reasonable royalty becomes less certain or altogether impossible."); Jeremiah S.
Helm, Comment, Why Pharmaceutical Firms Support Patent Trolls: The
Disparate Impact of eBay v. MercExchange, 13 MiCH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L.
REV. 331, 342 (2006) (explaining the pharmaceutical industry's worries that the
eBay decision will harm it); Jonathan H. Urbanek, Note, A Postmortem for
Permanent Injunctions Against Business Method Patent Infringement in the
Wake of eBay v. MercExchange, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 607, 608 (2008) (arguing
that eBay places an insurmountable burden on owners of business method
patents seeking injunctions).
30 Damian Myers, Note, Reeling in the Patent Troll: Was eBay v. MercExchange
Enough?, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 333, 335 (2007).
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component of a larger product, and a patent troll's refusal to
license can delay or block the production of the entire invention.
Thus, the bargaining power of patent trolls may not be proportional
to the actual contribution of the patent to the overall product.
31
From this point of view, patent trolls are harmful to
competition and innovation, preventing follow-on innovation on
patents and keeping products out of the market. Yet the patent troll
problem cannot necessarily be solved with an ex ante approach to
patent law by changing patentability standards or patent rights.
Patents do not have inherent attributes that predispose them to
trolling activity, and it would be impossible to change patent law to
specifically filter out patents that might be used by patent trolls.
While it is true that trolls often latch on to questionably valid
patents, the problem isn't only, if at all, in the validity of these
patents. A perfectly valid patent can be used by a patent troll if the
right circumstances arise. 32 Thus, more stringent standards at the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) cannot solve a problem
that does not fully arise until after the patenting process. While the
PTO could be more careful in assessing the patentability of
inventions with troll potential and scoping the claims of these
patents as narrowly as possible, a patent's right to exclude
intrinsically confers both value and leverage on the patent owner
that cannot be entirely eliminated.
EBay can therefore be viewed as keeping the patent trolls in
line in an ex post way that the PTO cannot. EBay essentially
reduces a patentee's leverage by limiting the right to exclude once
it is clear that this right gives a patent owner too much leverage
against potential infringers. Specifically, it can be argued that eBay
leans toward denying an injunction to patent trolls precisely
because, with an injunction, a patent troll can force a license for
the patent for a much higher value than the patent's actual
contribution to the overall product.33 Because the patent troll does
not practice his patent, monetary remedies should sufficiently
compensate him without irreparable harm in the form of new
competition or effective removal from the market. 34 Moreover,
eBay vindicates the public's interest in seeing the overall product
produced at the most efficient cost. A company whose entire
product is held up by one patent can prove greater hardship than
the patent troll.
31 Id. See also Helm, supra note 29, at 336 ("An injunction would give
MercExchange the right to hold eBay's entire business operations hostage,
thereby increasing the bargaining power far beyond what is reasonable.").
32 If patent trolls only profited off invalid patents, their bargaining power would
be significantly less than it has shown to be.
33 See Helm, supra note 29, at 337.
34 Id. at 338.
2008-2009
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B. EBay Unfairly Harms the Value of Patents to Non-
Practicing Entities
Thus, at first glance, the eBay factors seem to come out on
the right side-the side against patent trolls. However, not
everyone views patent trolls in such a negative light. For instance,
Miranda Jones defends patent trolls, which she calls non-practicing
entities to remove the stigma of the name.35 First, she notes that
licensing a patent but not practicing it is not illegal, and eBay errs
in "predicating the grant of the only adequate remedy for
infringement on actions that patent owners have no legal duty nor
legal right to undertake." 36 Jones claims that patent trolls play a
crucial role in the patent world. They deter freeriders by increasing
the likelihood of litigation and therefore the costs of infringing.
37
They maintain the validity and reliability of the patent system by
enforcing valid patents. Jones also believes that patent trolls help
innovation and competition by helping inventors to profit from
their inventions (by buying patents from inventors who can't
necessarily commercialize or enforce them on their own);
establishing the market value of patents through license
negotiations that ensure that the company that values the patent
most gets the right to it; and encouraging competition and
innovation in design around inventions, which can be even more
beneficial to the public than the original invention.
38
The disagreement on the culpability of patent trolls may be
due to the vague and broad nature of its definition. Those who
dislike "trolls" accuse them of using undue leverage to hold up
legitimate enterprises, while those who defend them laud them for
upholding the integrity of the patent system. It seems that these
groups are arguing about different things patent trolls versus non-
35 Miranda Jones, Casenote, Permanent Injunction, a Remedy by Any Other
Name Is Patently Not the Same: How eBay v. MercExchange Affects the Patent
Right of Non-Practicing Entities, 14 GEO. MASON L.REV. 1035, 1036 (2007).
36 Id. at 1039. Jones notes that patent owners have a negative right to prevent
others from using their invention but not necessarily a positive right to practice
their invention themselves. Likewise, the Copyright Act declares that "no patent
owner otherwise entitled to relief ... shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of
misuse ... by reason of his having ... refused to ... use any rights to the patent
.35 U.S.C. § 271 (d)(4) (2000).
37 Jones, supra note 35, at 1043. Some argue that the patent system is failing in
its ultimate goal of disclosures precisely because companies do not look at or
consider other patents when designing their products. See, e.g., Note, The
Disclosure Function of the Patent System (or Lack Thereoj)), 118 HARV. L.
REV. 2007, 2023 (2005) ("[M]any innovators follow a strategy of 'willful
ignorance' with respect to the patents in their field."). If this is the case, innocent
infringement "freeriding" may be more of a symptom of a failed patent system
than a contributing problem.
38 Jones, supra note 35, at 1043. For further defense of non-practicing entities,
see Raymond P. Niro & Paul K. Vickrey, The Patent Troll Myth, 7 SEDONA
CONF. J. 153 (2006).
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practicing entities. At the least, patent trolls simply seem to be
non-practicing entities of which society disapproves.
Unfortunately, there is no easy way to categorically distinguish
between the two, and if eBay cracks down on both
indiscriminately, this could be a problem.39 In any event, the
decision reduces the bargaining power of patent trolls by giving the
infringer the option of refusing to license. 40 Instead of litigating
with the goal of finding the patent invalid or the device non-
infringing, an infringer can litigate with the goal of forcing a
license agreement on the patent troll-for an amount that is
arguably less than what the patent troll would have liked. Whether
patent trolls or non-practicing entities deserve to have the value of
their patents reduced, this is, nonetheless, taking place.
IV. BRINGING EBAY INTO A LARGER CONTEXT: THE ENTIRE
PATENT SYSTEM
Some argue that the concept of a "troll" is a myth, that the
definition of "troll" is ambiguous and simply used whenever one
41party wants to cast the other in a negative light. If this is the case,
then eBay should not be read as a case affecting only patent trolls.
A reasonable question to ask is whether the line is so clearly drawn
at patent trolls that we need not worry about other patents and
patent owners-patent owners we generally like more than patent
trolls. There is reason to think that, whether or not it was intended
solely as a method to police patent trolls, eBay has had and will
have an effect on other patents.
While the Supreme Court did not give much guidance on
how to apply the four factors, some worry the decision will
adversely affect the pharmaceutical industry, as well as business
method and software patent owners.4 2 The focus on non-practicing
patent owners seems to have translated to a general rule that direct
competition between owner and infringer encourages an
injunction, while lack of direct competition generally means the
denial of an injunction.43 However, patent trolls are not the only
entities that may choose not to practice their patents, and they are
39 If eBay stops not only patent trolls but also non-practicing entities, then the
benefits of such entities, as described by Jones, will be lost.
40 See Niro & Vickrey, supra note 38; George, supra note 28, at 567-68
(explaining that eBay creates a liability rule instead of property rule for patent
trolls, forcing the patent owner to accept payment for infringement instead of
enjoining the infringer).
41 See Niro & Vickrey, supra note 38 (explaining that the term "troll" was
created to justify questionable legal tactics taken against patent owners).
42 See Helm, supra note 29; Urbanek, supra note 29.
43 See Edward D. Munzo, Injunctions in Patent Cases After eBay, 7 J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 44, 53 (2007); Jeremy Mulder, Note, The
Aftermath of eBay: Predicting When District Courts Will Grant Permanent
Injunctions in Patent Cases, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 67, 80 (2007).
2008-2009
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not the only entities that do not compete directly with potential
infringers.44
Scholarship and cases following eBay suggest that the
decision will have an effect on a variety of types of patents and on
a variety of players. However, a focus on the effect of the decision
on a specific type of patent or industry may prevent a true
assessment of the impact and soundness of eBay when considering
the patent system as a whole. Analyzing how the decision interacts
with the entire patent system may help courts understand how they
should apply the decision in a variety of contexts. I therefore
suggest looking at the decision, not from the perspective of
individual industries or players, but by taking into consideration
the origins and policy motivations for patent law as a whole. As
discussed above, the rule in eBay may change the value of certain
patents. A patent owner who might be denied an injunction has less
bargaining power in licensing his patent. Moreover, if eBay is used
to deny an injunction and force a license when the patent owner
would have opted against one, it can deprive the owner the value
of denying the license.45 This effect on the value of a patent will
likely interact with patent law and the patent system as a whole. In
this section, I show that a general analysis of the effect of eBay on
the patent system should be done with consideration of one of its
primary justifications: the quid pro quo.
A. Incentive Justification of Patent Law
Congress has been authorized to grant patents "[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries. 46 Many use this clause to
explain the patent system as a system of incentives: by granting an
inventor an exclusive right in his invention, Congress motivates the
44 See, e.g., Everding, supra note 29, at 190.
45 Not only will a patent holder be harmed at the initial stage of negotiating for
licenses, before any suit commences, by the loss of bargaining power, he will
also be harmed by the denial of an injunction once infringement is found. In
some situations, a court may deny a permanent injunction, but encourage the
parties to enter into their own licensing arrangement. In such a situation, the
patent holder has less bargaining power in negotiating this license than he would
have had had an injunction been granted. The grant of an injunction does not
necessarily guarantee that an infringer will have to stop use of the patented
invention, it simply gives the patent owner a choice between excluding the
infringer or using the injunction as a large bargaining chip in negotiating for a
license. Denial of an injunction therefore deprives the patent holder of
substantial value in this choice and bargaining power. Whatever the patent
holder's intention-to license or to exclude he reaps less from his invention
when an injunction is denied.
46 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
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inventor to invent and to share his invention with the public.47
Essentially, the government holds a carrot in front of the
inventor-a valuable monopoly on whatever he invents-to
motivate the inventor to innovate and share his innovation with the
public. If eBay affects the inventor's incentive, it will affect how
much effort and investment the inventor makes on his innovation.
If an inventor has to discount the value of his patent to account for
the possibility that the patent will not result in an absolute right to
exclude, he may not invest, invent, or disclose as much.
Nonetheless, a focus on incentives is misguided. This
justification for patent law is an ex ante view of the system, and
any examination of eBay's effect on patent incentives, will focus
on how the decision will influence the decision to invent and
patent. EBay, however, is an ex post decision-it does not affect
every patent and does not affect the patentability of any invention.
The analysis conducted under the eBay factors is very contextual,
and therefore it is likely impossible to know whether a certain
patent will be affected by the decision at the actual time of
patenting, and unlikely that an inventor will truly be able to
consider the effect of the decision when deciding what to invest
and whether to patent.48 If eBay is to affect the incentive function
of patent law, it will mostly do so indirectly, through its overall
effect on the patent system. Furthermore, just as eBay is an ex post
decision, patent trolling is an ex post problem. Changing patenting
standards will not stop patent trolls, nor can it account for the
unique circumstances that arise after patenting and give patent
owners opportunity for undue leverage. An ex ante analysis of
eBay's interaction with the patent system cannot account for these
factors.
B. The Quid Pro Quo of Patent Law: The Patent as an
Exchange
47 See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998); Susanna Chenette,
Note, Maintaining the Constitutionality of the Patent System, 35 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 221,228 (2008); Jones, supra note 35, at 1043.
48 As eBay is currently used, there is an even stronger argument that an
incentives analysis will go nowhere. While eBay lowers the value of a patent, it
is unclear whether a patent owner can account for the decision at all when
making the decision to invest and patent. A patent owner generally patents with
the expectation that he will practice or license, in the case of research
institutions his patent. David B. Conrad, Note, Mining the Patent Thicket: The
Supreme Court's Rejection of the Automatic Injunction Rule in eBay v.
MercExchange, 26 REV. LITIG. 119, 135 (2007). EBay currently comes into play
only when that situation has changed. Thus, eBay's effect on incentives cannot
be predicted and will have to be observed empirically.
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The incentives justification of patent law, however, has an
ex post alter ego: the quid pro quo.49 The incentive held out to
motivate invention and disclosure is also what is given in exchange
for such actions. Thus the patent system is often viewed as "a
carefully crafted bargain that encourages both the creation and the
public disclosure of new and useful advances in technology, in
return for an exclusive monopoly for a limited period of time.',
50
An inventor is motivated to invent and disclose because, in
exchange for doing so, he receives the right to exclude others from
making and using his invention. This exchange is the "quid pro
quo" of patent law, where the patent is payment for the invention
and the knowledge that comes with it.
51
The quid pro quo is an ex post view of patent law where
patent and invention already exist. An analysis of eBay under the
quid pro quo therefore makes more sense than an examination
under an incentives justification: it allows us to look not just at the
invention at issue, but at how the invention and its patent comes to
be used-matching an ex post view of patent law with an ex post
decision.52 We should therefore ask: how does the reduction of a
patent's value caused by eBay affect the individual exchange
between public and inventor?
Since the quid pro quo can be viewed as an ex post version
of the incentive justification, answering this question can also help
us examine how eBay interacts with the incentive function of the
491 do not assert that these two justifications for patent law are the same, as there
are certainly differences between incentives, rewards, and exchanges. However,
for the purposes of this note, which examines the change in the value of a patent,
the justifications can be viewed together. The lesser the incentive, the less is
incentivized. Similarly, a lesser reward should be given for a lesser, not greater,
achievement. Finally, the lesser the value of one side of an exchange, the lesser
the other side should be.
51 Pfaff 525 U.S. at 63.
51 Id.; Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966); Universal Oil Prods. Co. v.
Globe Oil & Refining Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484 (1944); Pennock v. Dialogue, 27
U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 23 (1829). But see Subba Ghosh, Patents and the Regulatory
State: Rethinking the Patent Bargain Metaphor After Eldred, 19 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1315, 1321 (arguing that the quid pro quo is just an empty metaphor).
52 The incentives theory and the quid pro quo theory are certainly not the only
justifications for patent law. For instance, commercialization theory argues that
patent law functions to encourage the commercialization of technology by
making such commercialization profitable. See, e.g., Conrad, supra note 48 at
135. While it may seem that a theory of patent law focusing on
commercialization would be the correct justification of a case that, thus far, is
generally used to deny injunctions to patent owners who fail to commercialize
their inventions, the commercialization theory is an ex ante approach to patent
law. Patent law may encourage commercialization by granting patents, but it
does not require it once patents are granted. This theory may be accurate from
an ex ante perspective, but patent law explicitly declares that it is not patent
misuse to suppress and not practice a patent. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4) (2000); see
also Conrad, supra note 48 at 135. Therefore, it is ill-suited to justify an ex post
decision like eBay.
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patent system. The denial of an injunction under eBay may reduce
the value of patents to the point where the inventor gets much less
in return for his invention and disclosure than what he is giving,
which would effectively defy the original intent of the parties.
53
This outcome would help to answer the incentives question: if
eBay alters the value of the reward of disclosure, so it no longer
measures up to what was given for it, this will affect the parties'
choices when negotiating the exchange in the first place.
54
Looking at the quid pro quo, however, can also account for
other possibilities, besides the harm to incentives. First, the above
possibility probably sweeps too broadly to be true. Multiple
variables already affect the accuracy of the patent exchange. For
example, no matter the industry or subject matter, all patents
receive a twenty year right to exclude from the date of the patent
application 55 even though the inventions may have different
worth.56 Some inventions may be worth more than others, and,
from an incentives perspective, a patent system that grants a longer
exclusive right or some other benefit to an inventor would bring
out more of these inventions and bring disclosure to a level closer
to optimal.57 But some inventions may also be worth less than
others. If this is the case, then the patent system is doing more than
it needs in order to obtain the creation and disclosure of certain
inventions.
58
The Supreme Court's concern about this risk of
overcompensation was evident in eBay.59 Patent trolls who litigate
trivial patents to hold up the production of larger products are
perfect examples of how a patent can be used to extort more value
from an invention than it may contribute to the public. The Justices
clearly felt that, in these situations, a reasonable royalty decided by
the court would more accurately compensate the patent owner than
a license negotiated under uneven bargaining terms in a hold-up
53 See, e.g., Helm, supra note 29, at 342.
54 Of course, if a patent owner can accurately calculate the probability that eBay
will negatively affect the value of his patent, incentives theory tells us he will
act accordingly by investing less to start with, thus ensuring that the quid pro
quo remains intact. However, it is unlikely that such a valuing can truly occur.
See supra note 48. In any event, a quid pro quo analysis allows both
possibilities-that eBay ultimately harms the quid pro quo, or that it forces a
reduced exchange, therefore impacting incentives.
55 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2008).
56 Eric E. Johnson, Calibrating Patent Lifetimes, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 269, 283 (2006).
57 Id. For various legal scholarship attempting to calculate better sized patent
terms, see Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent
Continuations, 84 B.U.L. REV. 63, 95 n. 127 (2004).
58 See Johnson, supra note 56; Helm, supra note 29, at 337.
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situation. 60 Under contract theory, if one party receives a better
bargain than what he gives in return, this uneven exchange would
not justify altering the original agreement. The patent, however, is
not simply a contract, and if a patent represents an uneven
exchange, then eBay may help to equalize the original exchange to
bring the value of a patent more in line with what was given for it.
61 This outcome would allow the incentivizing function of patent
law to be better tailored to the individual patent-giving the
inventor only what he needs to be motivated to invent and disclose.
In the alternative, the use of the eBay factors may lead to an
opposite result, reducing the value of those patents that actually
contribute the most to the public. This outcome might harm the
incentivizing function of patent law in a worrisome way. Another
possibility is that eBay reduces the value of a patent, but does so
inconsistently and with no relation to the values of the original
exchange.
Although there are many explanations for the structure and
reason behind patent law,62 an analysis of the interaction between
eBay and the quid pro quo is best. Since both the decision and the
justification take an ex post view of patents, looking at the
individual inventor and patent after the exchange has occurred,
they are a natural fit. Furthermore, since the quid pro quo views the
patent as an exchange for invention and disclosure, it allows us to
ask not only whether eBay tilts the exchange too far in favor of the
public, but also whether eBay misses the chance to bring the
exchange to a better balance or tilts the exchange more in favor of
the inventor.
V. EBA YTNCONSISTENTLY AFFECTS THE QUID PRO Quo
A question remains whether the denial of an injunction
under eBay conforms to the quid pro quo, goes against it, or simply
60 The requirement in eBay that monetary damages be adequate compensation in
order for an injunction to be denied suggests that the monetary damages given
would be equal in value to an injunction. However, even some of the Justices
acknowledged that an injunction would give patent trolls too much power. Id.
They could not have thought that monetary damages would compensate the
patent troll the same as an injunction, just more accurately.
61 But see Nuno Pires de Carvalho, The Primary Function of Patents, 2001 U.
ILL. J.L. TECH & POL'Y 25 (arguing that patents act as meters that inherently
measure the value of the underlying invention). It is possible that both the Court
and Pires de Carvalho are correct in their analysis. If a patent normally values
the underlying invention correctly, the grant of an injunction will correctly
ensure that the patent owner is accurately compensated and uphold the quid pro
quo. However, eBay and the existence of patent trolls suggest that patents may
malfunction as valuing meters. Therefore, EBay and the analysis conducted
here, might be considered a backup solution to this problem.
62 For a description of the various theories of patent law, see Conrad, supra note
48, at 133-37. But see Chenette, supra note 47, at 229 (arguing the quid pro quo
is inherent in all theories justifying patent law).
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reduces the value of various patents in no relation to their initial
contribution. There are two ways to look for a possible answer to
this question. First, I will examine potential outcomes based on an
analysis of the four factors in eBay. Second, I will examine the
actual outcomes of post-eBay cases denying and granting
injunctions. Of course, both analyses require a method for
assessing the value of an invention's contribution to the public.
A. Assessing the Original Contribution in a Patent
Exchange
In order to evaluate how eBay affects the patent exchange,
we must be able to properly value an invention's contribution to
the public. 63 I suggest four steps in assessing the status of the
exchange between public and inventor for any given patent.
64
Step 1: Assess the general benefit to the public from the
invention and disclosure. The most easily identifiable criterion to
assessing the exchange between public and inventor is the face
value of the invention and its disclosure. This includes the cost of
the investment required to create the invention. Of course, even an
invention that requires no upfront investment may have significant
value to the public because it is extremely useful. 65 An invention
can also have value beyond its mere existence. Some inventions
bring the public value when the inventor publicly discloses their
use in a patent. The more the invention contributes to the public,
the more valuable its disclosure. Thus, some inventions have more
value when their patents spawn follow-on and design-around
inventions.
Step 2: Limit this assessment to only the value of the
contribution obtained specifically because of the patent
incentive. While the factors above can measure the face value of
63 For possible methods of determining the value of any given patent, see
Mohammad S. Rahman, Patent Valuation: Impacts on Damages, 6 U. BALT.
INTELL. PROP. L. J. 145 (1998).
64 It is important, in such an analysis, to keep in mind the distinction between
patent and invention. While the two are frequently interchanged, they are quite
different. The patent exchange consists of an inventor contributing his invention
and disclosure in return for the patent the invention is what the inventor gives,
while the patent is given by the public.
65 This factor comes with a number of caveats: no matter how beneficial to the
public, if an invention would have been created absent the incentive of a patent,
then it has little value in terms of an exchange. There is also the question of how
much is needed to incentivize the creation of such an invention. If the inventor
would have disclosed his invention for much less because of the minimal cost of
creation, then its value in the exchange should again be considered quite small.
These inventions will have the most value when they would have been easy to
keep secret, and thus the value comes not from invention but from disclosure.
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an invention to the public, it is important to remember that, with
regard to the quid pro quo, we must consider the value of an
invention in the context of the patent system. Therefore, as a basic
premise for the process of assessing the value of an inventor's
contribution to the public, it is important to keep in mind the
overall purpose of the patent system as an incentive to invent. It
seems reasonable to assume that the law offers a monopoly in
exchange for exactly that which it is meant to incentivize-that
which it wouldn't get otherwise. 66 If an inventor's contribution to
the public, or part of that contribution, would reach the public
domain without the incentive of the patent system, whatever value
this part may have should not be attributed to the value of the
inventor's contribution. Thus, inventions that have enough external
incentives separate from the patent system and a nature that
requires disclosure, so that the patent system is not needed either
to incentivize invention or to encourage disclosure, may have little
value in terms of an inventor's contribution to the exchange with
the public. The likelihood that the invention would have been
created and disclosed without the patent system is therefore a
relevant consideration.
67
To assess the likelihood that an invention would have been
created and disclosed absent patent law, one should first consider
the need for an invention in the normal course of business. If there
are other incentives motivating invention, then the prospect of
patent protection may not be needed as an incentive. Second, when
the prospect of profit exists without the need for the right to
exclude, inventions are more likely to be created without the
incentive provided by patent law.68 Third, some inventions require
great upfront investments in research and development. These
66 "If the public were already in possession and common use of an invention
fairly and without fraud, there might be sound reason for presuming, that the
legislature did not intend to grant an exclusive right to any one to monopolize
that which was already common. There would be no quid pro quo no price for
the exclusive right or monopoly conferred upon the inventor for fourteen years."
Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 23 (1829).
67 For example, Andrew W. Erlewein suggests that "counsel working with
companies that have simplified otherwise complex business procedures or that
have unique methods in a competitive industry can create opportunities for
clients if steps are taken to protect those business methods." Andrew W.
Erlewein, Protecting Key Business Methods with Patents, 86 Mi. BAR J. 28, 29
(2007). He is implicitly pointing out that such methods were created without the
patent system. Business method patents are routinely the subject of criticism for
unpatentability. See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 288,
397 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Rick Nydegger, B2B, B2C and Other
"Business Methods": To Be or Not To Be Patent Eligible?, 9 U. BALT. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 199 (2001 ).
68 While products difficult to reverse engineer seem to fall in this category, the
value of disclosure, compared with the small relative value of the patent itself,
suggests that these inventions have high value to the public for patenting
purposes. See infra Part IV, section 2.
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inventions are less likely to be made without the guarantee of an
exclusive monopoly and the ability to recoup the cost of the
investment. Thus, the amount of investment required to create the
invention can inform us of the likelihood the invention would have
been created without the reward of a patent. 69 Finally, if
competitors are also trying to develop the invention, it is more
likely the invention will come to fruition and be disclosed without
the incentives of patent law.
Step 3: Assess the value of the patent right given in exchange
for invention and disclosure. The third step requires us to assess
the value of the patent to the inventor. Once we have determined
what aspects of invention and disclosure are contributed precisely
because of the patent incentive, we must consider how much of an
incentive is needed to procure such a benefit to the public. We
have been discussing the reduction in value of a patent caused by
the eBay decision as if all patents initially have equal value to an
inventor. However, eBay may have a different effect on two
inventions that, after an assessment under the two steps above,
would have equal value because the initial value of the patent, the
value that is being reduced, is different. Therefore, we must
consider not only the value to the public of certain inventions and
disclosures, but also the value to the inventor of the patent he gets
in return-a measure of the incentive the patent system provides.
7 0
Patents for inventions that do not have substitutes, for
instance, are quite valuable, and the patent owner is therefore
receiving more for his contribution than a patent owner whose
invention has multiple substitutes. In light of the fact that patent
law incentivizes not just invention but disclosure, one should also
consider the likelihood that an invention could be reverse
engineered. If an invention can easily be reverse engineered, there
is a greater need for a patent in order for the inventor to benefit
from his invention, and thus less incentive is needed for invention
and disclosure. Similarly, the harder an invention is to reverse
engineer, the more is needed to incentivize disclosure, and
therefore the greater the value of the disclosure to the public in the
69 This factor can also be relevant in Step 1. The cost of invention can indicate
both a high face value and that an invention would not exist without the patent
system. The fact that it is relevant to both steps means that the cost of creation is
a substantial factor in determining the patent's overall value in the patent
exchange. However, it should not be the only one. The mere fact that a valuable
invention was inexpensive to reduce to practice does not mean that its
conception or disclosure would have occurred without the incentive of a
valuable patent. Moreover, a large investment that has a guaranteed return may
need less of an incentive than a risky, small investment.
70 See supra note 63.
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patent exchange. 71 Inventions that have a short shelf-life also
correspond to lower valued patents. If an invention derives most of
its benefit in the first five years after invention, before something
better comes along, then a patent for it is worth less to an inventor
than one for an invention that remains relevant for twenty years.
Step 4: Compare the results of Steps 2 and 3. Ideally, the quid
pro quo should be an even exchange-the value of what the public
receives should be the same as the value of what it gives. Thus, a
truly equal exchange will result in the same value assessment for
Step 2 as for Step 3. However, as discussed above, this outcome is
extremely unlikely to occur for every single patent because the
patent system is simply too uniform relative to the variety of
inventions it covers. Therefore, as discussed above, it is important
to examine whether a denial of an injunction under eBay brings the
value of Step 3 closer to Step 2, or creates a greater disparity in the
patent exchange.
B. The eBay Factors Can Be Used To Support or Go
Against the Quid Pro Quo
One manner of assessing the impact of eBay on the quid
pro quo is to attempt such an analysis from the rule of the case
alone, and ask: when will the individual eBay factors weigh in
favor of denying an injunction? When the patent exchange
currently favors the inventor, when it favors the public, or neither?
Likelihood of Irreparable Injury and Remedies Available at
Law. The four eBay factors are clearly related. The likelihood of
irreparable injury from the denial of an injunction is greater when
there is no true remedy at law. A court will likely find irreparable
harm when the benefit of the patent comes mostly or solely from
the specific ability to exclude others (and not from the ability to
license). If the value of the right to an invention comes solely from
the right to exclude others, then the public's contribution of the
exchange is high, and the patent owner may conceivably be getting
more for his contribution than he deserves. However, the denial of
the right to exclude would remove almost the entire value of the
patent for such an invention and overly tip the balance of the
exchange in favor of the public. If a court finds that a high value
from the right to exclude means that a patent owner will be
irreparably harmed by the denial of an injunction, then, these
factors might be consistent with supporting the quid pro quo,
maintaining the balance instead of tipping it too far in favor of the
public.
71 With that said, if an invention is so easily reverse engineered that, absent
patent law it would not be invented, then its contribution in the exchange is
much greater.
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Many courts seem to be base their decisions regarding
these eBay factors on whether infringer and patent owner directly
72compete. Courts reason that if the two parties directly compete,
then a license may not be enough to compensate for the
73competitive loss from the denial of an injunction. However, we
must consider situations in which the owner and infringer don't
compete. For example, in the patent troll situation, the
owner/patent troll and the infringer do not compete because the
owner/patent troll does not practice the invention. For most patent
trolls, denying an injunction makes sense if we want to maintain
the quid pro quo. Patent trolls purchase patents and wait until other
companies fully develop infringing products in order to obtain the
highest licensing fees possible. If these companies are not willfully
infringing, then the patent was probably not needed to get the
invention into public hands, and reducing the value of the patent is
the best way to match the relative value of the invention to the
public. Patent trolls are also known for holding up the production
of larger inventions by enforcing patents that constitute only a
small component of an overall product. When these patent trolls
have the power to exclude, they receive leverage that is much
greater than that derived from the actual value of the invention, and
thus much greater in value than the contribution to the public.
74
Nonetheless, patent trolls may actually play an important
role in the patent system. For example, many small inventors do
not have the financial resources to enforce their patents, and these
patents are constantly infringed by larger companies. It is not clear
the invention would have been created otherwise-we do not know
all avenues of disclosure, and it is certainly possible that the
inventor's patent provided the information needed for these
companies to develop their products.75 Now, suppose a small
inventor invents a breakthrough product. Perhaps it even becomes
a basic component of a number of inventions that greatly benefit
the public. This invention and its disclosure, which inspires
multiple follow-on inventions, should be highly valued under Step
1, as discussed above. The inventor and patent owner should
therefore get a significant value in return for his contribution. If a
small inventor cannot enforce his patent, however, a patent troll
72 See Munzo, supra note 43, at 53; Mulder, supra note 43, at 80.
73 See, e.g., Wald v. Mudhopper Oilfield Servs., No. 04-1693, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 51669 (W.D. Okla. July 27, 2006); z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,
434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 440-41 (E.D. Tex. 2006).
74 See supra Part III.A.
75 Perhaps the inventor is an academic who published his theoretical findings in
a paper prior to patenting his product. A company could "ignorantly" infringe
the patent by basing its product off this research, but it is unclear that, without
the patent system, an inventor would be as comfortable disclosing his invention
through such freely accessible means.
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might step in to buy and enforce the patent.76 In such cases, it is
less clear whether denying an injunction to the patent troll is the
most efficient thing to do because we want to encourage patent
trolls to adequately compensate such inventors. If the patent troll
anticipates receiving less from his patent right because he might be
denied an injunction, he will not be willing to pay the inventor for
the patent right.
Scholars also worry that these factors, which weigh the
likelihood of irreparable harm and adequate remedy at law, might
lead a court to hurt the interests of patent-owning small businesses
and startups. 77 These small businesses may not be viewed as able
to compete against larger companies, even if they practice their
patents.78 If this is the case, these factors can go against the quid
pro quo. A small company, in an emerging industry or with a
promising new technology, might create the type of ground-
breaking inventions we want to protect the most. To deny an
injunction would go against the quid pro quo, reducing the value of
a patent for an invention that contributes the most to the public.
When one only considers whether there is competition
between the patent and the infringing invention in assessing
irreparable harm and the availability of remedies, entities which
practice an invention that spans industries or areas of an industry
may also be put in danger. Consider a chemical compound which
has both cancer-curing abilities and the ability to increase the
strength and flexibility of plastics. 79 Just because the owner does
not practice in both industries does not mean the value of this
invention is any less than the value if he did, and the denial of an
injunction for such a patent would go against the quid pro quo,
tipping the balance of the exchange in favor of the public and
against the inventor, even when the invention is contributing the
most to the public.
80
Balance of the Hardships. To conduct a balance of the
hardships, a court weighs the harm done to the infringer if he is
76 See Jones, supra note 35, at 1043.
77 See Everding, supra note 29; Grab, supra note 29, at 112-13.
78 See, e.g., z4 Technologies, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 440-41.
79 It is certainly not unusual for a new medication to have multiple effects that
allow its use in very different areas of medicine. It is also not difficult to
conceive of a car manufacturer inventing a new, lighter, crash resistant metal,
only to have a train manufacturer steal the technology. These examples may be
contrived but they can happen.
80 This value across multiple industries may need to be discounted somewhat in
Step 2: if the inventor truly anticipates a use only in his own industry, then he
anticipates a patent that brings him less value than one for an invention that
spans industries. This means that the actual patent that results is more than is
needed to motivate invention and disclosure. However, there are certainly
inventions which, even at conception, clearly have cross-industry uses, and
therefore inventors that anticipate valuable patents in return for invention and
disclosure.
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enjoined against the harm to the owner if the injunction is denied. 81
This factor could have several potential outcomes.
A balance of hardships can be used to deny an injunction
when the infringing product is so essential to the infringer's
business an injunction would ruin it.82 Such essential inventions
are precisely those that contribute the most to the public, and
denying an injunction reduces the value of what the public gives in
return. While we may sympathize with the infringer, the use of this
factor to deny an injunction in this case does not comport with the
quid pro quo.
The balance of the hardships can also be used to favor the
smaller party, whether inventor or infringer. If a startup patent
owner is denied an injunction, he may lose all his assets. The same
might happen to a startup infringer who is enjoined. Whether this
factor maintains the balance of the quid pro quo, however, depends
on who the smaller party is. Smaller companies may represent
emerging industries with breakthrough patents. An injunction is
therefore most certainly warranted to protect the quid pro quo if
the inventor is a small start-up. If the small company is infringing
on an already patented new technology, however, then protecting
him, and denying an injunction, would upset the balance of the
quid pro quo by reducing the value of a patent granted in exchange
for invention and disclosure of a valuable invention.
Public Interest. This factor's relation to the quid pro quo
entirely depends on how it is interpreted. The public interest factor
may weigh against denying an injunction because the public has a
great interest in maintaining the reliability of the patent system. 83 If
this is the case, then this factor does not upset the balance of the
quid pro quo (although it may not help it)-it simply leaves the
exchange as it was, however imbalanced. However, if the public
interest factor is used not to maintain the patent system, but to give
back to the public precisely those inventions that are most
important to the public well-being, then this factor can go against
the balance of the quid pro quo by altering the patent exchange
significantly in the public's favor. There is a significant risk to the
81 Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (U.S. 1987). Aside
from any quid pro quo issues, the use of this factor in such a manner may
encourage companies to turn a blind eye to the patent system and fully develop
their products without ever checking for potential infringement. See Yixin H.
Tang, Recent Development, The Future of Patent Enforcement After eBay v.
MercExchange, 20 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 235, 250 (2006).
82 See, e.g., Transcript of Hearing at 125, Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Group, Inc.,
No. 05-264, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70303 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 1,2006) (denying
an injunction where the infringer's main business depended on the infringing
product).
83 Commonwealth Scientific & Indus. Research Org. v. Buffalo, 492 F. Supp. 2d
600, 607 (E.D. Tex. 2007).
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patent system if the public is allowed to take away the right to
exclude for precisely those inventions it wants the most.
8 4
C. Courts' Application of the eBay Test Affects the Patent
Exchange Inconsistently
It seems from this analysis that the eBay factors allow an
injunction in a manner which comports with the quid pro quo of
patent law by maintaining the high value of patents for inventions
which represent valuable contributions to the public, but they can
also upset the balance of the quid pro quo when the denial of an
injunction reduces the value of a patent for a valuable invention. A
number of post-eBay cases illustrate this point.
Citing eBay, the Southern District of Texas in Transocean
Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. GlobalSantaFe Corp.85
decided that an injunction was warranted when a GlobalSantaFe
oil drilling device infringed Transocean's apparatus claims in the
patent-at-issue.8 6 The court also found a likelihood of irreparable
harm because the two parties directly competed against each other
in the relevant market.87 GlobalSantaFe argued that monetary
damages would be sufficient because of Transocean's expressed
willingness to license its patent and because the invention-at-issue
was only one of many features of the infringing device.88 The
district court rejected this argument despite Justice Kennedy's
suggestion in eBay that an injunction may be denied to prevent
undue leverage in licensing negotiations when a patented invention
is only a small component of the infringing product.8 9 The court
noted that while the infringing device had many other features, the
patented component contributed to the rigs' core functionality. It
rejected the argument for monetary damages, noting that though
Transocean was willing to license its patent, it also practiced its
patent and a compulsory license would "not contain any of the
commercial business terms typically used by a patent holder,"
harming Transocean's ability to control its business. 90 Moreover,
the court found that a limited injunction forcing GlobalSantaFe to
alter its rigs to not infringe (as opposed to an injunction enjoining
all use of the rigs), would not place an undue burden on
84 It should be acknowledged that prior to eBay courts have in rare instances
exercised their discretion to deny injunctive relief in order to protect the public
interest in public health. See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1547
(Fed. Cir. 1995); see also Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858,
865-66 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
85 Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. GlobalSantaFe Corp., No.
03-2910, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93408 (S.D. Tex. 2006).
86 Id. at *3.
g7 Id. at *13.
gg Id. at *15.
89 eBay v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006).
90 Transocean, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93408 at *18-19.
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GlobalSantaFe, and therefore the balance of hardships weighed in
favor of Transocean. 91 Finally, the court found that public interest
favors the enforcement of patent rights, and that GlobalSantaFe's
claims that the public would be harmed by a delay in oil
production would be moot under an injunction limited in scope.
92
The Transocean court allowed an injunction when doing so
would seem to maintain the balance of the quid pro quo. The court
found it relevant that the patent-at-issue related to the infringing
device's core functionality. Though GlobalSantaFe tried to claim
that it would also be stopped from using the prior art,93 the court
rejected this argument and even found a way around it through an
injunction limited in scope. 94 To add to this, the court had
originally found that the infringing device did not infringe the
method claims of the patent, meaning that GlobalSantaFe was
using the device in follow-on form, with a new method, combined
with different features. As discussed, inventions that spur follow-
on innovations are precisely the kinds that should be promoted
because they contribute the most to the public. The court's
decision to grant an injunction therefore likely maintained the
balance of the quid pro quo. Furthermore, this decision seems to
acknowledge that such a consideration is relevant. The court
recognized that denying an injunction and forcing reasonable
royalties would harm the patent holder in his ability to control his
patent 95 -a recognition that is similar to acknowledging that the
denial of an injunction, whatever the situation, may reduce the
value of a patent.
The use of the eBay factors to maintain the balance of the
quid pro quo can also be found in Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. Synthes
(U.S.A.). 96 The court here acknowledged that Smith & Nephew's
patented medical device was a new technology that "filled a
market gap" and found that Synthes's infringement contributed to
Smith & Nephew's failure to successfully commercialize its
product.97 The court's finding of direct competition and direct
harm from that competition led it to conclude that there was a
likelihood of irreparable harm.98 Moreover, the fact that
"[m]onetary damages generally are not an adequate remedy against
future infringement because the central value of holding a patent is
the right to exclude others from using the patented product," led
the court to conclude that monetary damages were inadequate.
99
9' Id. at *23-24.
92 Id. at *25-26.
93 Id. at *20.
94 Id. at *28-35.
95 Id. at *19.
96 466 F. Supp. 2d 978 (W.D. Tenn. 2006).
97 Id. at 983.
98 id.
99 Id. at 984.
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Since Synthes would suffer no hardships "inseparable from the
plaintiffs right," the court found the balance of hardships in Smith
& Nephew's favor. 100 Finally, the district court concluded that the
public's interest in maintaining the integrity of the patent system
and the availability of other alternatives on the market favored an
injunction. 1
Smith & Nephew's patented device is exactly the kind of
device courts should find to have a large contribution in the patent
exchange. The device was not only a medical device that was, in
itself, valuable to the public, it also filled a market gap, suggesting
even greater value to the public. The court specifically
acknowledged that damage to Smith & Nephew's right to exclude
would be inadequately compensated by monetary damages.
Finally, it found public interest in favor of an injunction because of
the public interest in promoting the integrity of the patent system
and did not try to bring the invention into the public domain sooner
than the patent allowed due to the value of low priced medical
technology. Smith & Nephew seems to be consistent with eBay in
trying to maintain the important balance of the quid pro quo.
The district court's decision on remand in eBay seems at
first to comport with the quid pro quo of patent law. 0 2 The court
emphasized the fact that MercExchange's patent was for a
questionable business method patent 0 3 and the fact that
MercExchange would only use an injunction as leverage for a
license, viewing this leverage as unjustified.10 4 The court found
that monetary remedies would be adequate, noting that
MercExchange did not practice its patent and had also expressed a
willingness to license.10 5 Because MercExchange did not practice
its patent, it might be deemed a patent troll. There are legitimate
arguments that patent trolls essentially work to achieve a value for
their patent greater than that of the contribution of invention and
disclosure, and thus the denial of an injunction would keep this
activity in line.
Valuing the MercExchange invention, however, is difficult.
MercExchange was founded by the inventor of the patents-at-issue,
1oo Id. (quoting Can. Lumber Trade Alliance v. United States, 441 F. Supp. 2d
1259, 1267 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2006)).
101 Id. at 985.
102 MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556 (E.D. Va. 2007).
10' Id. at 586 (finding the questionable nature of the business method patent to
render the public interest factor against MercExchange).
104 Id. at 582.
105 Id. at 583. This fact was also relevant in balancing the hardships. Since
MercExchange only wanted to license its patent, denying an injunction would
not bring it significant harm. Id. at 584.
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Thomas Woolston. 106 He tried to practice his patent, but was
unsuccessful in commercializing it. 10 7 MercExchange approached
eBay for licensing arrangements, but instead sued the giant when it
discovered eBay was willfully infringing its product.10 8 Viewed in
this light, MercExchange and Woolston seem more like non-
practicing entities, small inventors who, in failing to
commercialize their product, attempt to license it instead. EBay
now seems like the freerider, benefiting from MercExchange's
disclosure by willfully infringing to a point where a court is no
longer willing to stop its activities due to the economic impact
such a decision would have. The economic success of eBay tells us
that Woolston's invention is highly valued by the public, and yet
MercExchange was denied the ability to bargain for its true value
with eBay.
10 9
It is entirely possible, however, that the invention-at-issue
in this case contributes little to the public. It is entirely likely that
the invention, a business method patent, would have been invented
without the patent incentive, rendering it of little value under Step
2 described above. EBay clearly profited off the product without
having any right of exclusivity. The district court acknowledged
that the patent "appears to rely upon a unique combination of non-
unique elements present in prior art,"' 110 lending more support to
this possibility. MercExchange might simply have been lucky in
being the first to patent a method that would have inevitably come
to the market, and eBay unlucky in using a method that was
already patented. Whatever the value of an invention, if it does not
need patent law to be disclosed to the public, it provides little in a
quid quo pro exchange. It seems that the court, however
accidentally, might have gotten this one right.
Perhaps the most relevant consideration in these cases
should be findings of willful infringement. As discussed, the value
of an invention to the public largely depends on the level of
disclosure an invention provides, and whether it would have been
created absent this disclosure. A finding of willful infringement
suggests that the infringer (1) has taken advantage of that
disclosure and benefited from it and (2) would not have invented it
otherwise. While the MercExchange patent suggests that willful
infringement should not be dispositive, it may be beneficial to use
106 Sue Ann Mota, EBay v. MercExchange: Traditional Four-Factor Test for
Injunctive Relief Applies to Patent Cases, According to the Supreme Court, 40
AKRON L. REV. 529, 533 (2007).
107 See Urbanek, supra note 29, at 619.
108 ld.
109 Of course, if Woolston's invention was only a minor part of eBay's overall
product, then its value might be questioned. Nevertheless, the facts can be
interpreted either way.
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it as a presumption of invention value, without further proof to the
contrary.
In z4 Technologies, the District Court for the Eastern
District of Texas denied an injunction for a patent for product
activation software despite a finding of willful infringement.111 Z4
did not practice its patent in competition with Microsoft, claiming
that it failed to commercialize its product largely due to
Microsoft's infringement.'12 The court found, however, that z4 and
Microsoft did not directly compete. Z4 would usually license its
patent to software producers, who would include the activation
software in their software sales to prevent unauthorized use.
113
Microsoft did not sell the software to other software producers, but
used the activation software in its own Office and Windows
programs. 114 The court therefore found that the only licensing sales
z4 lost due to Microsoft's infringement were sales to Microsoft,
and a compulsory license was warranted due to the likelihood of
irreparable harm and inadequacy of a legal remedy. 11 5 The court
found that an examination of the balance of hardships favored
Microsoft, since an injunction forcing Microsoft to pull its
infringing products and design around the patent would be a
significant burden. Such an injunction would force Microsoft to
deactivate the infringing component and result in widespread
pirating of Microsoft products, causing "incalculable losses."
116
Finally, the court found that the public interest favored Microsoft,
given the public's dependency on its products.
117
Some might view Z4 Technologies as a small start-up in a
battle against the giant Microsoft. Z4 owned an invention so useful
that Microsoft chose to willfully infringe the patent. The company
depended on the invention to such an extent that deactivating it
would result in countless amounts of piracy to its two main
software products. The fact that Microsoft willfully infringed z4's
technology suggests it found the product worth the risk of
litigation, suggesting a high value in disclosure to the public. These
facts suggest that the z4 invention significantly benefited the
public, yet the court determined no injunction was needed because
z4 and Microsoft did not compete. If we are to assume that an
injunction would have resulted in a higher licensing fee than the
I Z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 438, 440-41 (E.D.
Tex. 2006).
112 Id. at 440.
113 id.
114id.
115 Id. at 440-41.
116 Id. at 442-43.
117 Id. at 443-44.
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forced royalties given by the court, then surely this decision goes
against a quid pro quo analysis. 
1 8
VI. CONSIDERING THE QUID PRO Quo UNDER EQUITY
Even if eBay may be used inconsistently, to either balance
the relative exchange between inventor and public or create a
manifest imbalance, none of this matters if the quid pro quo is not
a valid consideration with which to start. I suggest that an equitable
analysis leaves room for consideration of the quid pro quo
exchange because a valid goal of equity is to ensure that the patent
right is as closely tailored to the value of an inventor's contribution
as possible.
A. The Exchange Between Patentee and Public Is a Valid
Consideration Under Equity
First and foremost, a consideration of the quid quo pro, and
an after-the-fact tailoring of the patent right, are consistent with the
goals of patent law. Not only is the quid pro quo a justification of
Congress's right to grant patents, it is inherent in the requirements
of patentability. 19 Courts generally have no problem invalidating
patents, or even patent claims, in furtherance of these
requirements.
The first justification in equity we can find for such
consideration is in Justice Kennedy's concurrence in the eBay
decision itself. Justice Kennedy noted the "potential vagueness and
suspect validity" of business method patents, and felt that such
suspicion could warrant applying the four factor test. 120 However,
Justice Kennedy's argument seems out of place. Normally,
remedies are only issued after a finding of wrong-doing. In this
1S But see Bernard H. Chao, After eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange: The Changing
Landscape for Patent Remedies, 9 MTNN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 543, 560-61 (2008)
(arguing that the decision in z4 Technologies supports the motivations of the
patent system by adequately compensating the patent owner relative to the value
of his contribution). Chao's analysis, however, looked at the value of the
invention at issue in terms of its relative contribution to Microsoft's overall
product. This paper argues that another valid consideration would be a valuation
of the invention as a whole regardless of its size relative to the infringing
product. I do not suggest that z4 came out incorrectly. It is possible that the
equitable considerations between the parties did and should have outweighed
any consideration of the quid quo pro exchange. See infra Part VI. I merely
point out that such an exchange was neither mentioned nor supported in the
decision.
119 See Chenette, supra note 47, at 229 ("The statutory patentability
requirements maintain this quid pro quo.").
120 EBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 397 (2006).
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case, the four factor test for whether an injunction should be issued
should only come after a finding of patent infringement and/or
patent validity. Yet, Justice Kennedy did not directly argue that
business method patents are invalid. Nonetheless, we can view
Justice Kennedy's note about business method patents, along with
his comments about the potential for monetary damages to
adequately compensate patent owners, 121 as a recognition that an
injunction can be denied in order to bring the reward of a patent
more closely in line with its contribution. If a patent is vague
enough to render it overly broad or is of suspect validity, then
monetary damages may better reflect the value of the patentee's
contribution than an injunction would.
Another source also suggests that the original contribution
of an invention ought to be a legitimate equitable consideration.
The nature of the patent right and the equitable doctrines that have
developed around that right suggest that a consideration of the
contribution of invention and disclosure, and its relation to the
patent exchange, is legitimate under equity.
The patent right is not a moral right. Although "fruits of
your labor" Lockean justifications for intellectual property
abound, 122 the tradition of the American patent system tells us that
the patent right "is a special privilege designed to serve the public
purpose." Therefore, "the public [has] a paramount interest in
seeing that patent monopolies [are] free from fraud or other
inequitable conduct and ... kept within their legitimate scope. 1 23
Although the patent right is enforced through infringement actions
against individuals, it is a right against the public, granted by the
public, in exchange for invention and disclosure of knowledge.
The paramount importance of the public interest in patent law can
be seen in the equitable doctrines that surround it. Although classic
equitable doctrines apply across all areas of law, patent law has
developed doctrines unique to it, doctrines that often focus the
equities not on the parties in suit, but on the patentee and the
public.
"[E]quitable defenses [to patent infringement] include...
unenforceability of the patent for fraud and inequitable conduct,
misuse, and delay in filing suit resulting in laches or estoppel. ' 24
These defenses focus on the patentee's conduct before the public
121 Id. at 396.
122 See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality
and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J.
1533, 1541-45 (1993); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property,
77 GEO. L.J. 287, 296-330 (1988).
123 Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816
(1945).
124 Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 268 F.3d 1323, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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and its representative in the patent office. 125 Each can be seen as a
method of ensuring that a patentee does not get what he does not
deserve. In United States v. American Bell, 126 the Supreme Court
found that the United States government had standing to sue for
cancellation of a patent for fraud upon the PTO despite the fact that
such arguments were also made available as defenses to accused
infringers in the Revised Statutes. 127 The Court recognized that the
real interest involved was the public's and refused to find that the
public interest could only be vindicated by an accused infringer
looking out for his own interests. 128 American Bell suggests that
the public interest in the patent right does not end with the grant of
a patent-the public has a right to ensure that the exchange, with
its grant of a monopoly for invention and disclosure, is fair.
American Bell shows that while inequitable conduct before
the PTO is an individual equitable defense, the primary interest is
the public's interest, not the accused infringers'. The accused
infringer is wronged by such conduct because he is part of the
public and depriving him of the use of his device harms not only
him but the general public as well. The Supreme Court's decision
in Precision Instruments also shows that the balancing of the
equities can focus on public and patentee in a consideration of
inequitable conduct. The Court found that even more reprehensible
conduct by the infringer was irrelevant when fraud had been
conducted before the PTO because "[t]he public policy against the
assertion and enforcement of patents claims infected with fraud
and perjury is too great to be overridden by such a
consideration." 129 Finally, inequitable conduct before the PTO
does not require that the party attempting to enforce the patent that
resulted from this conduct be the party acting inequitably.1 30 This
shows that the focus of inequitable conduct is on the patent, not the
behavior of the party attempting to enforce his or her right.
The doctrine of patent misuse similarly considers more than
just the equities between patentee and infringer, but also the
equities between the patentee and public. For example, in Morton
Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., the Court noted that an accused
infringer need not be affected in any way by the antitrust-like
actions of a patent holder in order to claim patent misuse as a
125 These are not the only equitable defenses, and I am not trying to claim that all
application of equity must involve the quid pro quo. There are certainly
equitable doctrines that focus on the private parties involved, such as,
assignment estoppel, prosecution laches, and unclean hands.




128 Id. at 372.
129 Precision Instrument Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. at 819.
130 See Stark v. Advanced Magnetics, Inc., 119 F.3d 1551, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(concluding that an "innocent" inventor may not enforce a patent that has been
tainted by inequitable conduct).
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defense to infringement.1 31 As the Court explained, "successful
prosecution of an infringement suit even against one who is not a
competitor in such a sale is a powerful aid to the maintenance of
the attempted monopoly of the unpatented article, and is thus a
contributing factor in thwarting the public policy underlying the
grant of the patent."'1 32 The Court did not give weight to the fact
that the wrong of which the patent owner was accused had no
effect on the infringer-the public, as well as the infringer, was
harmed by enforcement of the patent.
"The patent law simply protects [the patentee] in the
monopoly of that which he has invented and has described in the
claims of his patent."' 33 Patent misuse is found precisely when a
patentee has used his patent to secure a monopoly beyond the
bounds of the right granted to him by the public. This misuse does
not focus on actions taken towards the infringer, but instead on
actions against the public. While a finding of inequitable conduct
before the PTO is a finding of fraud before the public in the
original exchange of information for monopoly, patent misuse is a
finding of a violation of that exchange by taking more than what
was given. Thus patent misuse again allows a consideration of the
rights not between the parties in suit, but between the parties of the
original exchange: patentee and public. Again, patent misuse
shows that the significance of the equities between public and
patentee do not end upon grant of a patent-the public can be
harmed by abuse of a correctly granted right just as it can be
harmed when that right is wrongfully procured.
Finally, the doctrine of prosecution laches 34  also
underscores the relationship between public and patentee.
Prosecution laches is found when a patentee acts to unreasonably
delay prosecution of a patent, usually to extend its monopoly 35 or
to broaden his patent claims to cover newly developed
technology. 36 By delaying prosecution, the patentee gains an
unfair advantage by securing a longer or larger monopoly than he
131 314 U.S. 488, 493 (1942).
132 Id.
133 Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 510
(1917).
134 See Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson Med., Educ. & Research Found., 277
F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (acknowledging the defense of prosecution laches
when a delay in prosecution prejudices intervening adverse public rights).
135 See Woodbridge v. United States, 263 U.S. 50, 56 (1923) (finding a delay in
"securing a patent that might have been had at any time in that period for the
asking, and this for the admitted purpose of making the term of the monopoly
square with the period when the commercial profit from it would be highest").
136 See Webster Elec. Co. v. Splitdorf Elec. Co., 264 U.S. 463, 465 (1924)
("During all of this time [the] subject-matter [of the claims] was disclosed and in
general use, and [the inventor] and his assignee, so far as [the] claims [at issue]
are concerned, simply stood by and awaited developments.").
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should have received. 137 This practice "puts off the free public
enjoyment of the useful invention,"'1 38 harming not just a potential
infringer who might innocently invent an infringing device while
the invention is suppressed, but the public as a whole. Thus, the
doctrine of prosecution laches is another equitable decision based
on the equities between the patentee and the public.
B. Equitable Doctrines Allow a Court To Tailor the Patent
Right To Conform to the Exchange
Thus the equitable doctrines of patent law acknowledge
that the patent is an exchange between the inventor and the public,
and therefore consider the equities between them. These doctrines
also do more: they allow a specific consideration of the accuracy
of that exchange, analyzing the size and scope of the patent right in
relation to the contribution of invention and disclosure. Each of the
doctrines discussed above seem to ensure that the patent right is
not stronger than the patentee's contribution.
A finding of inequitable conduct before the PTO is usually
based on deception relating to the patentability of a certain device.
Areas of particular concern are (1) the statutory oath
of inventorship, particularly as it relates to the
question of prior public use by the inventor or his
assignee; (2) the citation of known relevant prior
art; (3) the use of affidavits concerning the date of
invention; and (4) the use of affidavits presenting
factual evidence on patentability.'
1 39
A patent may still carry a presumption of validity despite false
statements made to the PTO if such statements were not material to
patentability.1 40 The danger of inequitable conduct is therefore
found not in the simple deception of an officer of the public, but in
the risk of "fraudulent patent monopolies"-monopolies for
patentees who do not deserve it. 141 Thus, the doctrine of
inequitable conduct focuses on the fairness of the right granted to
the patentee, ensuring that it cannot be exercised if it should not
have been granted.
The best evidence of this fact can be found in the Third
Circuit's decision in In re Multidistrict Litigation Involving Frost
Patent.142 Although there was a finding of inequitable conduct, the
conduct was not so egregious as to bar enforceability of the patent
137 Woodbridge, 263 U.S. at 56.
138 Id.
139 6 CHISUM ON PATENTS § 19.03 (2008).
140 See Corona Cord Tire Co. v. Dovan Chem. Corp., 276 U.S. 358, 374 (1928).
141 See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806,
818 (1945) (explaining the public interest in ensuring that inequitable conduct
does not go undetected).
142 540 F.2d 601 (3d Cir. 1976).
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as a whole, and the court declared the patent enforceable except as
to those aspects of the claim relating to the inequitable conduct.
143
In doing so, the Third Circuit punished the patentee for lying to the
PTO and ensured that the patentee's right did not go beyond what
he had actually contributed to the public. This shows an equitable
doctrine resulting not in the denial of the patent right, but the
tailoring of it to more accurately reflect the contribution of
invention and disclosure.
As mentioned above, patent misuse is found when a
patentee uses his right to gain a monopoly that extends beyond the
scope of his patent. This is in violation of the patent exchange
because the patentee is taking more from the public than what was
meant to be given. The Patent Misuse Reform Act of 1988 added
to the Patent Act by declaring:
No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for
infringement or contributory infringement of a
patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of
misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by
reason of his having . . .refused to license or use
any rights to the patent [or] conditioned the license
of any rights to the patent or the sale of the patented
product on the acquisition of a license to rights in
another patent or purchase of a separate product,
unless, in view of the circumstances, the patent
owner has market power in the relevant market for
the patent or patented product on which the license
or sale is conditioned.
144
Patent misuse is not found simply when a patentee uses his patent
in a way contrary to the public interest (by refusing to practice or
limiting the availability of his product); it is only found when such
use goes beyond the patentee's original right, when the patentee
uses market power in one area to gain a market advantage in
another where such a right was not granted.
Similar to a finding of inequitable conduct, a finding of
patent misuse does not completely remove the patent right. It
simply allows the court to tailor the right to what the patentee
should have, or originally did, receive. "[T]he courts will not aid a
patent owner who has misused his patents to recover any of their
emoluments accruing during the period of misuse or thereafter
until the effects of such misuse have been dissipated, or
'purged' .',45 If the effects of misuse have been purged, a patentee
can recover damages, but only for infringement that occurred after
143 Id. at 611 ("Under the totality of the circumstances, we have concluded that
this record requires a denial of enforcement of Patent No. 3,072,582 only to the
extent that its claims purport to apply to flexible polyether urethane foams.").
144 Pub. L. 100-73, 102 Stat. 4674 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4), (5)).
145 U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457, 465 (1957).
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such a purge is deemed complete. 146 In Gypsum, the Supreme
Court found that a denial of enforcement of a patent because of old
misuse, the effects of which have been purged, would constitute
"an unwarranted penalty" on the patentee.1 47  Denial of
enforcement is a method of ensuring that a patentee cannot use his
patent beyond its original scope. Again, these cases demonstrate
that equitable doctrines can be used not just to deny the patent
right, but to force it to conform to the scope of the original
exchange. A finding of patent misuse prevents a patentee from
profiting from the unwarranted expansion of his patent right by
denying him the monopoly and profits from infringers until he has
returned the right to what the public originally intended it to be.
The doctrine of prosecution laches can also be understood
as specifically enforcing the balance of the quid pro quo.
Prosecution laches occurs when a delay in prosecution results in
new innovation being encompassed.1 48 While in some situations
these later innovations are encompassed through interference
proceedings, they can conceivably make it to market occasionally,
which suggests that invention without a patent is possible and
therefore the inventor's invention and disclosure is really a small
contribution to the public. Furthermore, prosecution laches comes
into play when the delay in prosecution results in an expansion of
the monopoly to include a right to an invention that the inventor
did not contribute. Delaying prosecution may also confer the
advantages of a monopoly at a time when the device in question is
more entrenched in the market and therefore corresponds to a
patent that is more valuable.1 49 Since Woodbridge involved a
patent application undisclosed to the public, 50 it may imply a troll-
like situation in which the invention would have been created
otherwise and the patentee only patents the device to pounce on
unsuspecting infringers.
There is one area of law that justifies this consideration in
the most direct manner: the doctrine of equivalents. In Hilton
Davis Chemical Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., the Federal Circuit
declared the doctrine of equivalents to be a question for the jury,
and therefore not an equitable consideration. 51 Prior to this
decision, however, the doctrine of equivalents was occasionally
considered an equitable doctrine. 52 If it does have its roots in
equity, the doctrine gives direct justification for the use of equity to
146 E. Venetian Blind Co. v. Acme Steel Co., 188 F.2d 247, 254 (4th Cir. 1951).
147 352 U.S. at 474.
148 Webster Elec. Co. v. SplitdorfElec. Co., 264 U.S. 463, 466 (1924).
149 Woodbridge v. United States, 263 U.S. 50, 56 (1923).
150 id.
151 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed Cir. 1995) (en banc).
152 See Jennifer D. Threadgill, Casenote, Equivocating Between Equivalents and
Equity in Patent Infringement: Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson
Co., 51 ARK. L. REV. 191 (1998).
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correctly tailor the patent right to the original contribution. The
doctrine of equivalents is designed to give the patentee the right
not only to the literal claims of his invention, but also to anything
that is equivalent. 53 Otherwise, a patent would be rendered "a
hollow and useless thing" by someone who makes only
inconsequential changes to a patented device to bring it just outside
the area of literal infringement (defined strictly by the words of a
claim) while piggy-backing on the patentee's contribution.1 54 The
doctrine of equivalents is a direct example of courts acting to tailor
a patent right to the actual contribution of the invention.
Some courts, in applying the doctrine of equivalents, have
recognized this tailoring almost explicitly, noting that the doctrine
of equivalents should grant greater scope in accordance with the
value of the contribution to the art.' 55 If the doctrine of equivalents
can stand as an example of an equitable doctrine, these cases
would seem to indicate that tailoring the breadth of patent
protection to the extent of an invention's contribution is a valid
goal of equity. Moreover, these cases, as well as the doctrine of
equivalents itself, show that courts do have the power to decide the
scope of the patent right after it has been granted.
Finally, whether or not the doctrine of equivalents can be
viewed as falling under equity, a patentee can be denied use of the
doctrine under prosecution history estoppel.1 56 Prosecution history
estoppel is triggered when a patentee tries to invoke the doctrine of
153 Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1853) (establishing the
doctrine). But cf 1 CHISUM ON PATENTS: GLOSSARY. ("The doctrine can work in
reverse, excluding an accused device that falls within the literal language of a
claim but operates in an essentially different manner.")
154 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950).
See 1 CHISUM ON PATENTS: GLOSSARY.
155 See, e.g., Sarkisian v. Winn-Proof Corp., 686 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1981)
("Since the purpose of the doctrine of equivalents is to secure for the inventor a
just reward for his or her invention, patents which represent important and
significant advances in the relevant technology are entitled to a broad range of
equivalents; similarly, patents which represent a rather small advance in a
crowded field are entitled to a correspondingly narrow range of equivalents.");
Nelson v. Batson, 322 F.2d 132, 135 (9th Cir. 1963) ("[T]he degree of
protection afforded beyond the language of the claims will vary directly with the
value of the inventor's contribution to the art."); Royal Typewriter Co. v.
Remington Rand, Inc., 168 F.2d 691, 692 (2d Cir. 1948) ("All patents are
entitled to its benefit to an extent, measured on the one hand by their
contribution to the art, and on the other by the degree to which it is necessary to
depart from the meaning to reach a just result.").
156 See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S.
722, 733-34 (2002) ("The doctrine of equivalents allows the patentee to claim
those insubstantial alterations that were not captured in drafting the original
patent claim but which could be created through trivial changes. When,
however, the patentee originally claimed the subject matter alleged to infringe
but then narrowed the claim in response to a rejection, he may not argue that the
surrendered territory comprised unforeseen subject matter that should be
deemed equivalent to the literal claims of the issued patent.").
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equivalents for a claim that was changed for reasons of
patentability. 157 Prosecution history estoppel is clearly equitable in
nature, 158 and it is a prime example of a court reducing the reach of
a patent to accord with what the patentee actually contributed in
the exchange. The doctrine prevents the patent from extending to
devices and inventions that were not part of the original
contribution and are only accidentally covered by the words of the
patent. Thus, even if the doctrine of equivalents can be considered
as having its origins in law, not equity, the doctrine of prosecution
history estoppel supports the point that equity can be used to
ensure that the patent right is tailored to what is given for it, not for
what the words of the patent seem to cover.
VII. FITTING THE QUID PRO Quo INTO THE EBA YANALYSIS
As one can see, equity leaves room to tailor the patent right
to better balance the quid pro quo, demonstrating that such
tailoring can be a legitimate part of the eBay analysis. However,
one still must account for why equity considerations are better than
addressing the patent scope directly. As discussed, equity is not the
only way to tailor the patent right to the contribution. The doctrine
of equivalents, which wavers between law and equity, is perhaps
the best example of such tailoring. However, law forces courts to
follow the words of a statute, and so in turn, the words and
meaning of a patent. Although a patent right may be tailored to the
contribution by ensuring that the meaning of the claims of a patent
is interpreted to parallel the invention's actual contribution, this
strategy can only go so far. Equity and eBay can act as a
supplement to this tailoring. Equity may be a way to tailor the
patent right beyond what can legitimately be done under law,
limiting the patent to not just the words and meaning of its claims,
but also limiting its value to what it really contributes.
As discussed, courts relying on eBay to date have not
considered the value of the contribution of an individual patent
when granting or denying an injunction, and some cases suggest
157 5A CHISUM ON PATENTS § 18.05 ("The estoppel applies most frequently
when an applicant amends or cancels claims rejected by an examiner as
unpatentable in light of the prior art. Some decisions extend estoppel to
amendments entered for other purposes. Some decisions also extend estoppel to
an argument by a patent applicant even when the argument is not accompanied
by a claim amendment.").
158 See, e.g., Builders Concrete v. Bremerton Concrete Prods. Co., 757 F.2d 255,
258 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("This doctrine is an equitable tool for determining the
permissible scope of patent claims."); Laitram Corp. v. Cambridge Wire Cloth
Co., 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 289, 294 (D. Md. 1985) ("It really is not a
complicated doctrine; it is no more than a variant of the common law notion of
estoppel, that is, the equitable principle that you cannot come into court
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eBay can either be used to maintain or to disturb the balance of the
quid pro quo. I suggest two ways for courts to bring a quid pro quo
consideration into eBay.
A. The Quid Pro Quo in All Four Factors
The most radical method of considering the value of an
invention's contribution under the eBay factors is to interpret each
individual factor in light of such value. Courts today measure the
loss to a patentee from the denial of an injunction by the economic
gain a patentee could have received with that injunction. Courts
tend to focus on the profits to an individual or a corporation,
comparing the two possible outcomes: injunction or damages. One
method of considering the quid pro quo in an eBay decision would
be to include a different comparison between the value of the
patent when it includes the right to exclude and the possible effect
on the value of the patent if the injunction is denied. It is likely that
denial of an injunction will have an effect on the future valuation
of an individual patent by encouraging infringement and reducing
bargaining power for licenses. Courts should consider this
reduction in value as part of the loss. For instance, when
considering irreparable harm, one can look at the original
contribution of an invention to see if denial of an injunction brings
the patent more in line with the patentee's contribution (really no
harm at all) or results in severe under-valuation of that contribution
(irreparable harm). Similarly, in assessing the adequacy of
monetary damages, one could compare the overall contribution of
the invention with the damages for this instance of infringement. A
patent tied to a valuable contribution can weigh in favor of the
patentee when measuring a balance of hardships, while a patent
with questionable contribution may weigh against the patentee,
given the patentee's previously unwarranted benefit from the
patent.
B. Using Public Interest to Consider the Quid Pro Quo
An easier approach, and the one I ultimately advocate, is to
locate these considerations in the public interest factor of eBay,
giving this factor significantly more weight than it has previously
been given. It is surprising that courts have not focused on the
public interest factor more strongly, given a history of decisions
stressing the importance of the public interest in patent law.
Perhaps courts do not know how to weigh the factor. Some courts
have favored the public interest policy of enforcing valid
patents, 159 while others have found that the public interest weighs
159 See, e.g., Commonwealth Scientific & Indus. Research Org. v. Buffalo
Technology, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 600, 607 (E.D. Tex. 2007); Transocean
Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. GlobalSantaFe Corp., No. 03-2910, 2006
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in favor of allowing an infringer to continue to infringe.1 60 Courts
are understandably confused about how to weigh the public
interest because the two countervailing interests directly conflict.
A consideration of the quid pro quo could provide some guidance
on how to weigh the public interest to bring the two together. The
public has an interest both in ensuring that it does not give more
than it needs to receive an invention and its disclosure and in not
giving so little that it inadequately compensates contributing
inventors.
A quid pro quo approach to considering the public interest
would also allow courts to properly consider willful infringement,
a significant factor that has no clear place under eBay. The fact that
an infringer infringed knowingly should certainly matter under
equity. In fact, a parallel to real property suggests that the issue
should be dispositive: bad faith building encroachment generally
allows an injunction where normally monetary damages are
adequate. 61 It is clear, however, that courts do not take this view,
and it is understandable why they do not. Knowledge of building
encroachment is direct evidence that the actor is freeriding on his
neighbor's property. Willful patent infringement does not
necessarily mean that an infringer is free-riding on a patent owner
in the same way. A diligent company may come across a patent
after it has fully developed its own product, thereby gaining
nothing from the disclosure of the invention. A quid pro quo
analysis allows us to consider willful infringement while also
allowing us to reject willfulness as dispositive where, in fact, it
should not be. That is, willfulness will create a presumption of
value that is nevertheless rebuttable by evidence that the disclosure
of the invention did not contribute to society nor to the infringer's
actions in any meaningful way. Courts can allow continued
infringement for innocent infringers who have built companies or
products important to the public-without upsetting the balance of
the quid pro quo-by viewing innocent infringement as evidence
that the invention would have been created and disclosed even
absent the patent. At the same time, courts should find in willful
infringement a presumption of a valuable contribution and act
accordingly. 162 At times when the contribution of an invention is
less clear or more questionable, a court can reject consideration of
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93408, at *25-26 (S.D. Tex. 2006); Smith & Nephew, Inc. v.
Synthes (U.S.A.), 466 F. Supp. 2d 978, 985 (W.D. Tenn. 2006).
160 Z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437,443-44 (E.D. Tex.
2006).
161 Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the Right To Exclude: Of Property,
Inviolability, and Automatic Injunctions, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 593, 646
(2008).
162 See Everding, supra note 29, for an argument that willful infringement
should be more dispositive of the decision to grant or deny an injunction.
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the quid quo pro altogether and continue with the current analysis
for granting and denying injunctions.
A public interest in the enforcement of valid patents is too
broad to be of any use in the case-by-case consideration of an
injunction because it will always weigh in favor of an injunction,
but will never be affected by unique circumstances. Efforts to
provide a more specialized consideration of the public interest-by
considering the patent and the infringer and then finding public
interest whenever an infringer or the invention itself is valuable to
the public-can directly go against the purposes of patent law
because it denies the patent right whenever the public wants the
invention to enter the public domain, even before the patent has
reached its full term. A consideration of the quid pro quo exchange
would bring these two considerations together, still ensuring that
the public interest is properly served by protecting valid patents,
but doing so selectively, allowing courts to consider the real value
of the invention before deciding whether the patent owner should
have an absolute right to exclude. Furthermore, considering the
quid quo pro exchange in the public interest factor still allows a
clear consideration of the equities between the parties through the
other factors. Although the patent exchange is important, an
injunction is still an order against a private party in favor of
another, and a consideration of the equities between them is
warranted in any case involving a permanent injunction under
patent law or any other. 163 Though it is a valid consideration to
tailor the exchange under equity, it does not mean that courts
should ignore the fact that a suit for infringement is a private action
between private individuals. As Justice Kennedy noted, monetary
remedies can be adequate compensation for patent infringement
not only because of the value and nature of the invention, but also
because of the parties involved and their intentions.'
1 64
Finally, if courts give more significance to the public
interest factor in eBay and judge this factor in accordance with the
original patent exchange, eBay may act as a better, more selective
tool against patent trolls. When patent trolls or non-practicing
entities enforce patents for valuable inventions against willful
infringers, the patent system should vindicate their rights,
especially when the invention is a basic building block for industry
or science. The real worry comes when these patent trolls or non-
practicing entities try to enforce questionable patents that
contribute only trivially to an overall product, thereby holding up a
more worthwhile venture. Thus, it is important for courts to more
accurately identify the "trolls" from the "non-practicing entities."
Courts can do this not only by evaluating an invention's
163 See, e.g., Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311-13 (1982);
Amoco Prod. Co. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987).
164 eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006).
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contribution to the infringing invention, but also by looking at its
contribution to society as a whole and ensuring that their decision
maintains or improves the balance of the quid pro quo. To do so
would give effect to both concurring opinions in eBay,
acknowledging the changing landscape of patent enforcement
while still respecting the value and emphasis historically placed on
the right to exclude.
VIII. CONCLUSION
EBay v. MercExchange changes the landscape of patent
enforcement by taking away the absolute certainty of a permanent
injunction for infringement. The possibility that a patent could be
denied reduces the value of a patent by taling away the right to
exclude and the bargaining chip that comes with it. Although many
view the decision as a way to address the questionable actions of
modern patent trolls, it will also have widespread effects in other
areas. To keep this effect in line with the motivations and origins
of the patent systems, courts should consider not just of the
equities between the private parties, but also the equities involved
in the original patent exchange. By assessing the value of the
contribution of an invention, courts can ensure that eBay is used to
maintain a well-functioning patent system-giving patent owners
precisely what they deserve for what they have given to the public.
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